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LEGAL EDUCATION, ETHICS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE: 
FORGING WARRIORS FOR JUSTICE IN A NEO-LIBERAL WORLD 
Donald Nicolsoni 
Introduction 
 
One issue which has yet to receive any attention in the debate over the future shape of UK 
legal education post-LETRii is the place of access to justice (ATJ) in the curriculum. 
Currently, ATJ is one of eleven specified elements of one of the six areas of required 
knowledge for Scottish qualifying law degrees (Law Society of Scotland, 2010), whereas the 
English and Welsh Joint Statement on the Academic Stage of Training (Law Society and the 
General Council of the Bar, 1995) ignores the topic altogether. Short of a survey, it is 
difficult to ascertain how many law schools buck the traditional focus on covering the 
professionally required core in great detail and on substantive law options, but it is instructive 
that in the last survey of UK law schools (Harris and Beinart, 2004), only 20% taught legal 
system or skills courses, which along with from brief, often unassessed, introductions to law 
constitute the traditional home for ATJ. No doubt, some academics might discuss ATJ in 
classes dealing with legal process, sociology of the law, etc, but clearly the topic has a 
precarious and peripheral place in the curriculum.  
 This article argues that ATJ should be a central concern for both legal education and 
legal practitioners, and explores the potential for inculcating such a concern in law graduates 
through both traditional courses and clinical experience. Indeed, it argues that this potential is 
enhanced by the very same neo-liberal forces that make the issue of ATJ so urgent in UK 
society today and which seem to militate against an education which prioritises the sort of 
critical, contextual, and socio-legal approach which one might associate with ATJ teaching. 
To understand the paradox, it is necessary to start with these neo-liberal forces.   
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Access to justice and legal education in a neo-liberal world 
 
In its contemporary (but not original) usage (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009), neo-liberalism 
refers to an extreme form of laissez faire economic theory associated with Hayek and 
Friedman (see eg Clarke, 2004, Harvey, 2005, Thornton 2010, ch. 1).  It champions economic 
liberalisation, privatisation, free trade and deregulated markets, and seeks to reduce 
government spending as far as possible. Neo-liberalists believe that leaving matters to private 
enterprise is far more efficient than collective action, and consequently seek to replace the 
state with private enterprise, and notions of social justice and the public good with profit-
making and self-LQWHUHVW$V6DUDWDQG6FKHLQJROGSXWLWµ>Z@KHUHDVRQFHODLVVH]-faire meant 
keeping the state out of the market, today neoliberalism means bringing the market into the 
VWDWH¶6DUDW& Scheingold 2001, 7). In practice, virtually no sphere of UK society has been 
spared the neo-liberal turn -  certainly not ATJ and higher education. Indeed, it has been said 
that neo-OLEHUDOLVPµKDVEHFRPHLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKHFRPPRQ-sense way many of us 
LQWHUSUHWOLYHDQGXQGHUVWDQGWKHZRUOG¶+DUYH\S, producing an intensively 
individualistic subject - KRPR°FRQRPLFXV -who sees the world in terms of rational self-
interest (see eg Read, 2009) 
The impact of neo-liberalism on legal education has been most comprehensively 
documented by Thornton (eg 2010, 2012; see also eg Webb, 1999; Goldsmith, 2002; 
Bradney, 2003; Boon & Webb, 2010; Goldsmith & Bamford, 2010). Higher education in 
general has seen state investment plummet while student numbers shoot up, leading to 
increased teaching and administrative loads, and increased pressure to produce more research 
and more funded research. Moreover, especially after fees were introduced in England and 
Wales, a university education has been transformed from a public good into a commodity 
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PDUNHWHGWRVWXGHQWµFRQVXPHUV¶who in classical KRPR°FRQRPLFXV terms seem more 
interested in gaining credentials to compete on the labour market than intellectual and 
personal growth.   
This is a familiar story for all academics, but law schools face additional pressures. 
One source is the legal profession, itself facing the chill winds of neo-liberalism in the form 
of cutbacks to legal aid and competition from outside providers following deregulation of 
legal services and the shrinking of traditional monopolies. Along with globalisation, this has 
lead to law firms becoming bigger, and more profit-oriented and business-minded (see eg Lee 
1992; Sommerlad 1995; Francis 2005). Consequently, they seek graduates with the necessary 
skills and knowledge to be practice-ready profit-makers. In fact, the demands of all law 
employers for skills training and from the powerful large law firms for a focus on legal 
subjects relevant to commercial practice are echoed within the academy. As consumers of 
education services burdened with debt, students demand that their education makes them 
attractive to those employers who can ensure that they can repay their debts as quickly as 
possible, thus increasing the pull of commercial law practice. The resultant enhancement of 
student credentialism means that many law students are only interested in taking the core 
doctrinal subjects and optional subjects perceived to be attractive to prospective employers, 
such as those involving skills training or which have the same property and profits orientation 
as the core. This vocational focus is echoed by university management which has an interest 
in maximising student employment in order to attract new customers and appease the god of 
university league tables (see Hazelkorn, 2008 generally and Sauder & Espeland, 2009 in 
relation to (US) law schools).  
These pressures are not, however, uniformly felt. Elite universities are better placed 
than others to resist demands for greater vocationalism because students are arguably more 
LQWHUHVWHGLQWKHFDFKHWRIWKHLUµEUDQGQDPH¶WKDQVXEMHFWVWDXJKWDQGmany employers seem 
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PRUHLQWHUHVWHGLQµLQSXW¶DVUHSUHVHQWHGE\the new proxies for social class ± school 
attended, LQFRPLQJVWXGHQWV¶school results and most  social background crucially the status 
of university attended and o± and onnO\LQµRXWSXW¶DVUHSUHVHQWHGE\DµGHFHQWGHJUHH¶
(Sommerladd. 2007; Boon and White, 2010, p. 213, 220; Ashley and Empson 2013). It is 
WKXVXQVXUSULVLQJWKDWWKHµQHZ¶XQLYHUVLWLHVKDYHEHHQPRUHZLOOLQJWRSURGXFHYRFDWLRQDOO\-
oriented curricula (Boon & Webb, 2010, p.82).  
Nor has the neo-liberal project of constructing DKHJHPRQLFKRPR°FRQRPLFXV
subjectivity been entirely successful. Some students still enter law school with altruistic 
rather than self-interested reasons for studying law (Nicolson, 2013, pp. 41-43)..  
Nevertheless, all law schools have undoubtedly changed from the days in which they 
academics could teach according to their academic and political beliefs, albeit within the 
confines of qualifying degree requirements. Thornton is most exercised by the strangling of 
more theoretical, critical and social-legal approaches to law only shortly after their birth in 
WKHV7KLVUHYHUVDORIVXFKDµVRFLDOO\OLEHUDO¶OHJDOHGXFDWLRQKDVVKHDUJXHVEHHQ
accelerated by a number of cost-cutting measures like the reversion from small-group 
teaching to lectures which, like virtual and intensive learning, involvHDµRQH-ZD\IORZ¶RI
µIUR]HQNQRZOHGJH¶FRQFHQWUDWLQJRQGRFWULQHDQGIURPH[WHQGHGHVVD\VWRXQUHIOHFWLYH
forms of assessment like tests and hypothetical problems. However, while Thornton makes an 
HORTXHQWFDOOIRUODZVFKRROVµWRUHVLVWWKHWHPSWDWLRQWRSURGXFHQDUURZWHFKQRFUDWV¶
276), she offers little by way of concrete strategy for doing so.  
$SDUWIURP%UDGQH\¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHµLYRU\WRZHULVEHWWHUGHIHQGHGIURPEHKLQG
DPRDWZLWKDUDLVHGGUDZEULGJH¶VHHDOVR%UDGQH\Dsimilar lack of strategy is 
displayed by those who champion the more traditional conception of a liberal education in 
which knowledge is regarded as an end in itself, students are educated as persons and not 
workers, and universities prepare graduates for citizenship as much as a career (eg 
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Brownsword, 1999; Guth & Ashford, 2014).  Bradney argues that a liberal legal education 
LQYROYHVLQWURGXFLQJODZVWXGHQWVWRµDYDULHW\RIFRQYHUVDWLRQVZKLFKDUHJRLQJRQZLWKLQ
law¶ (2003, p. 87) and to the all-pervasive nature of values in law, but without seeking to 
indoctrinate particular views. Bradney accepts that wholly technical matters can and indeed 
should be taught; otherwise, the discussion of underlying legal principles and values will be 
shalORZ+RZHYHUKHDUJXHVWKDWµHPSOR\HUVFDQQRWH[SHFWXQLYHUVLW\ODZVFKRROVWRPDNH
VXUHWKDWWKH\JHWRQO\WKRVHJUDGXDWHVZKRWKH\ILQGWREHVXLWDEOHHPSOR\HHV¶S
172), not least because there is no common set of skills and knowledge in the modern-day 
highly fragmented legal profession and because so many graduates do not enter practice.   
By contrast, while also decrying the neo-liberal turn in legal education, Boon and 
Webb (2010) warn that law schools ignore professional demands for a greater vocational 
focus at the risk of the undergraduate law degree being replaced as the primary route to 
professional qualification by alternatives such as private legal education In such 
circumstances, the scope for more critical, theoretical and contextual approaches to law 
would dwindle to near vanishing point. Similarly, Goldsmith and Bamford (2010) and Boon 
and White (2010) argue that students have an equally legitimate claim to be stakeholders in 
legal education as without them law schools would not exist. According to Goldsmith and 
%DPIRUGµ>Z@KRZHDUHDVOHJDODFDGHPLFVFDQQRWEHVHSDUDWHGZKROO\IURPZKRRXU
VWXGHQWVDUH¶SDQGWKXVlaw schools cannot ignore their demands for greater 
engagement with legal practice. However, they do not see such engagement in purely 
vocational or technocratic terms. Instead, it may provide opportunities for connecting the 
µDVSLUDWLRQVRIODZVWXGHQWVZLWKSURIHVVLRQDOLGHDOVMXVWLFHVHUYLFHIDLUQHVVDQGWKHJRDOV
of a university-EDVHGHGXFDWLRQ¶p. 163; see also Goldsmith 1999, 2002; Boon 1998, 
166). Moreover, according to Goldsmith (2002) and many others (see references cited by 
Nicolson 2008, p. 165n.120), student involvement in live-client clinics provides the best 
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means to this end, while also ensuring an appreciation of law, justice and legal ethics that 
cannot be gleaned from any amount of standard teaching and learning.  
In the rest of the article, I apply these insights to the more specific goal of giving 
greater prominence to ATJ in legal education and to inculcating in students a commitment to 
the ideal of community service, albeit drawing upon a law clinical model which differs to that 
envisaged by Goldsmith and which, I will argue. provides a site for launching a counter-
hegemonic challenge to the neo-liberal vision of legal practice. First, however, the case for 
law schools and law graduates to take ATJ more seriously needs to be made. 
 
Taking access to justice seriously 
 
Here, at least four reasons can be offered. The first and most obvious is that justice is a 
central concern of a liberal legal education in its traditional or more critical incarnations. 
And, if one is interested in justice, then the fact that so many people are absolutely excluded 
from obstaining legal services or are handicapped by inferior legal services or self-
representation in obtaining whatever substantive justice law offers needs to be highlighted. 
Indeed some argue that access to a lawyer is a human right (Luban, 2014) or at least an 
essential prerequisite for human dignity, the rule of law and law's legitimacy (Luban, 
1988,ch. 11; 2005) and possibly even democracy (Luban, 1985) 
 SecondlyHYHQLIRQH¶VDLPLVVLPSO\WRGHVFULEHODZLQUHDOLVWLF (as opposed to black-
letter) terms, it also seems necessary to pay due attention to the fact that so many people are 
unable to vindicate their rights or defend themselves against legal detriments. For instance, to 
teach employment law without mentioning the difficulties of obtaining legal aid or the impact 
of recent Employment Tribunal fees would be grossly misleading. Moreover, attention to 
ATJ helps illuminate the contours of substantive law. For example, areas of law dominated 
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by case law will tend to reflect the interests of those who can access the courts and effectively 
vindicate their interests, rather than of those who cannot litigate or litigate effectively.  
 Thirdly, I would argue that ATJ is highly relevant to legal education if, as is 
becoming increasingly the case (Webb et al, 2013, paras 4.65-4.67), one regards legal ethics 
DVDFRUHHOHPHQWRIXQGHUJUDGXDWHOHJDOHGXFDWLRQ7KLVLVEHFDXVHE\DQDORJ\ZLWK5DZOV¶V
DUJXPHQWWKDWµ>M@XVWLFHLVWKHILUVWYLUWXHRIVRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV5DZOVSLWFDQEH
argued that the first virtue of the ethical lawyer is to ensure ATJ. Traditionally, legal ethics 
discourse focuses on issues of the morality of representation, both from the internal 
dimension of how lawyers should treat clients ± do they respect their autonomy, protect their 
secrets and zealously pursue their interests? ± and the external dimension of how they should 
treat others affected by client representation  - do they unjustifiably harm the interest of 
others, the administration of justice or the public interest more broadly? Such a focus, 
howeverRQO\JRHVVRIDULQDOLJQLQJODZ\HUV¶HWKLFVZLWKWKHLUFDOOLQJWRVHHNMXVWLFHZKLFK
DIWHUDOOLVWKHOHJLWLPDWRU\MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUODZ\HU¶VSURIHVVLRQDOVWDWXV1LFROVRQ 
For one thing, the goal of making practitioners aware of problems with neutral 
partisanship, confidentiality, conflicts and client autonomy is undermined where their scope 
for moral manoeuvre is highly constrained by financial considerations which cast morality as 
an unaffordable luxury or where responsibility for ethics tends to fall into the cracks because 
of the increasing specialisation of legal work or completely out of sight because of its 
increasing routinisation (see Nicolson and Webb 1999, ch. 3). This does not mean that law 
schools should not seek to ensure that law graduates enter practice with a desire to uphold 
ethical values where they can, if not fight for greater moral manoeuvre to do the right thing. 
Moreover, if ATJ problems are made more central to legal ethics teaching, lawyers might be 
more inclined to give them due regard in deciding on the morality of actions on behalf of 
clients (cf Nicolson and Webb, 1999, chs 8-10). However, it seems obvious that ethically 
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aware lawyers either devoting their career to those most in need of legal services or doing so 
pro bono is an improvement on only providing ethically aware services to the shrinking group 
of those who can afford to pay or obtain legal aid.  
Indeed, as I have recently argued (Nicolson 2013), notions of reciprocity or gratitude 
towards the community which through its taxes pays for school education and, still in 
Scotland, for much of the cost of legal education suggest that lawyers have a moral obligation 
to contribute in some way to enhancing ATJ. Public investment in their education enables 
law students to enjoy substantial financial rewards. However, only those fortunate enough to 
afford lawyers or qualify for legal aid benefit from this investment. Moreover, a major 
obstacle to ATJ is the high fees charged by lawyers. Consequently, it can be argued that these 
lawyers have a moral duty to take some remedial action to repay those who helped put them 
in their privileged position, but do not benefit from this investment. Two further arguments 
support a moral obligation on lawyers to enhance ATJ. One is that their earnings are partly ± 
albeit decreasingly ± protected by state limitations on who can practice law and access legal 
processes. Secondly, many ATJ problems, especially of a relative nature, stem from often 
unnecessary and difficult to understand legal complexities created by lawyers serving their 
clients (and indirectly themselves by making legal assistance more necessary). Here, lawyers 
can be said to have a moral obligation to help remedy the resultant ATJ obstacles.  
Indeed, and as a fourth reason for making ATJ more central to legal education, given 
that their livelihood is partly dependent on educating those who make a good living from 
legal practice, it is arguable that academics have similar obligation to enhance ATJ through 
consistently emphasising ATJ in their teaching and/or researching issues of ATJ but, 
preferably, because of the positive example it sets to students, through community legal work 
(Rhode, 2004, p. 157; Nicolson 2012), as was relatively common in the past (Partington 
1988, p. 381).  
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Locating access to justice in the curriculum 
 
If these arguments about the importance of ATJ in legal education are persuasive, they raise 
the question of where to locate ATJ in the curriculum and how we might inspire students to 
take ATJ seriously. I will concentrate largely on the latter issue since my views on the former 
largely track those I have previously expressed on teaching ethics at the academic stage of 
legal education, namely that ethics should be taught both pervasively and in compulsory 
stand-alone classes, and then backed up through live-client clinical experience (Nicolson 
2008). While pervasive teaching will expose students to the ubiquitous nature of ATJ 
obstacles and how the law taught in the rest of the curriculum actually operates in practice, 
unless taugth voluntarily, academics are likely to surreptitiously (or even not so 
surreptitiously) undermine the intended message and hence necessitate a stand-alone class.  
 However, unlike legal ethics, this need not be a full class. Instead, there are many 
potential homes for discussing ATJ. In addition to its common location in Introduction to 
Law, Legal System, and Legal Process classes, it could be taught alongside legal ethics or in 
Sociology of Law/Socio-Legal Studies classes. In addition to providing a comprehensive 
picture of the ATJ landscape, it is important that such classes are given a coherence, for 
instance by linking ATJ to related issues like the role of lawyers, legal ethics and legal 
SURIHVVLRQDOLVPUDWKHUWKDQFRPSULVLQJDUDJWDJRILVVXHVZKLFKFRPHDFURVVDVµVWXIIQRW
covered elsewhere in the important part of the FXUULFXOXP¶ 
 The more challenging issue involves the timing of stand-alone ATJ teaching. On the 
one hand, an early introduction to ATJ problems allows them to be referred to pervasively. It 
might also help prevent an indelibly rosy pictXUHRIODZ¶VMXVWLFHGHYHORSLQJDQG encourage a 
more critical approach generally. On the other hand, if ATJ is not taught pervasively there is 
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a case for locating it towards the end of the degree. This will allow reference to examples 
from other classes of how ATJ problems undermine law and justice. Moreover, it is arguable 
that will have more impact than if students are initially WROGµ\RXDUHDERXWWRVWXG\DUHDVRI
law which may provide valuable legal rights but be aware that many people may not be able 
WRDFFHVVWKHVHULJKWV¶, and then left to work out when and to what extent this applies. The 
impact of such a message is also likely to be undermined by the fact that incoming students 
expect to learn criminal law, contract, property law, etc and may either pay less attention to 
non-substantive subjects or positively resent being distracted from µUHDO¶ODZVXEMHFWV 
 
Access to justice and active learning 
 
While the question of the most effective location for ATJ teaching is a matter of speculation,  
by contrast, and by analogy with the growing consensus around ethics teaching (see Nicolson 
2008, p. 165), few are likely to doubt that the most promising means of encouraging students 
to take ATJ seriously is through exposure to those most in need of legal services via 
university law clinics RUSODFHPHQWVRUµH[WHUQVKLSV¶) in external legal service agencies. 
Lectures and even the most imaginative small group exercises, such as requiring students to 
decided how to allocate scarce legal aid resources amongst a list of needy applicants (victims 
of domestic abuse, asylum seekers, sacked single parents, etc), are never going to compete 
with the well-UHFRJQLVHGDGYDQWDJHVRIFRPELQLQJH[SRVXUHWRµWKHRUHWLFDO¶NQRZOHGJHZLWK
actual experience (see eg Bloch, 1982; Brayne et al, 1998). Thus, learning in adults is more 
effective if it draws upon actual experiences, and knowledge can be applied immediately in 
the fulfilment of expected future roles rather than stored for future use. Such learning also 
goes deeper ± both in the sense of knowledge being better understood and more readily 
accessible ± where learners are not treated as passive receptacles of abstract information to be 
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memorised and regurgitated, but required to obtain and transform knowledge through self-
discovery and reflection.  
If evidence of these advantages of experiential (or active) learning in relation to ATJ 
is required, it can be seen in the spontaneous comments in both oral examinations and 
reflective diariesiii by University of Strathclyde Law Clinic (USLC) student volunteers who 
either opt to take Ethics and Justice, a class exploring issues of legal ethics and ATJ in the 
context of their clinic cases, or are required to as part of the Clinical LLB which integrates 
clinic training and case experience into the standard LLB (see Nicolson, 2013, pp. 51-55). 
Thus, as one student responded in an oral examination when questioned about what she had 
PRVWOHDUQWIURPIRXU\HDUVLQWKHFOLQLFµ7KHRUHWLFDOO\LQ/HJDO3URFHVV>DILUVW\HDUFODVV@
they tell you that there is an unmet legal need, but that is one of those things that are 
LQWDQJLEOHXQOHVV\RXUHDOO\H[SHULHQFHLW¶In answer to the same question, another said:   
«WKHV\VWHPLVPLQFH<RXGRQ¶WUHDOLVHKRZEDGLWLVLQWKHDEVWUDFWUHDGLQJWDEOHV
DERXWOHJDODLG$QGWKHQ\RXUHDOLVHWKDWLWLVHQGHPLFDQGGHVSHUDWHDQGLW¶VRQO\
getting worse. The amazing thing is that it is so pervasive that it has come up in every 
essay I have written this year. 
Similar views were expressed in a diary entryµ%HIRUH,MRLQHGWKH&OLQLF,KDGDVWURQJEXW
quite vague, feeling that there was injustice in the legal system, but now having been 
involved with clients and cases I feel that I have a much more focused idea of what the 
problems are and where the injustice comes from, especially the availability (or lack thereof) 
of Legal Aid funding and the way the Tribunal system runs compared to how it was 
VXSSRVHGO\GHVLJQHGWR«¶ 
However, it is one thing for students to appreciate the extent of ATJ problems and 
TXLWHDQRWKHUIRUWKHPWRWDNHUHPHGLDODFWLRQRQFHWKH\JUDGXDWH$GDSWLQJ5HVW¶VQRZ
familiar model of the four psychological conditions required for moral behaviour (eg Rest, 
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1994), one might be confident that clinic students will develop the necessary sensitivity to 
problems of ATJ. However, they still need the necessary judgment to know how best to 
respond and, given that empirical research repeatedly shows that ethical knowledge is only 
weakly connected to ethical behaviour (eg Rest, 1994, 21-2), the commitment to care about 
doing the right thing and the courage to resist competing pressures and temptations. Fostering 
and guiding the development of these three components is likely to prove much more 
challenging.  
To guide judgment, students must REYLRXVO\EHH[SRVHGWRDUJXPHQWVDERXWODZ\HUV¶
moral responsibilities in relation to ATJ and the various ways in which they can be met. 
7KHVHUDQJHIURPGHYRWLQJRQH¶VFDUHHUWRKHOSLQJWKRVHPRVWLQQHHGVXFKDVE\working in 
legal aid practices, advice agencies or relevant law reform organisations, to engaging in 
various forms of pro bono work (most obviously giving advice and/or representation, but also 
training or otherwise supporting others involved in ATJ) or substantially reducing fees to 
LQGLJHQWFOLHQWVµORZERQR¶and finally to financially supporting those who work at the ATJ 
coalface.iv  
Persuading students of their obligations to enhance ATJ is unlikely to be easy. Those 
who regard neo-liberal ideology as a matter of common sense are likely to respond that 
individual lawyers are not responsible for imperfections in the legal services market, which in 
the long run is the most effective means of ensuring ATJ. More left-earning students might 
insist that the state should guarantee ATJ and that engaging in or financially supporting pro 
bono work or other organisations providing free legal assistance allows it to escape its 
responsibilities. But even if students resist the siren calls of neo-liberalism or the naïve 
optimism in its imminent demise, their commitment to a career enhancing ATJ will be tested 
by factors which flow from or are exacerbated by the neo-liberal impact on edcuatrion and 
legal practice such as the desire to repay debts and more generally to benefit from the 
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monetary investment in their education, whereas their commitment to engage in pro bono or 
financially support ATJ will be tested by the long hours of much legal work, and the time and 
financial pressures involved in trying to balance work and family life (Rhode, 2004, pp.166-
73; Sommerlad, 2007, p.202).  
Nevertheless, both theory and growing evidence from USLC student diaries suggests 
that clinical experience can prompt students to commit to enhancing ATJ once they qualify. 
Thus development psychologists, especially those influenced by the Aristotelian focus on 
character development (see Nicolson 2008, pp. 156-9, 165), point to at least three set of 
factors associated with the repeated immersion in morally charged life-experiences which 
help develop and sustain such commitment. One is that the exposure to flesh and blood 
people facing ATJ obstacles may evoke the emotions empathy or sympathy, which are so 
crucial to the development of a sense of compassion and personal moral responsibility (eg 
Hoffman, 2001). 
The client came to the clinic really as a last chance saloon after being through solicitors 
working pro-bono and also the CAB. When I found out that the client had already been 
through so much it hit me personally and I felt sad for the client knowing that she had 
been through so many different loops trying to seek justice problems.   
7KHPRUHWKHFOLHQWWDONHGDERXWKLVODVWIHZPRQWKVDWKLVMREDQGKRZPXFKKH¶G
enjoyed his work before that, the worse I felt for him.  ...  I found myself feeling really 
terrible for him, ... 
But it was not just feelings of empathy and sympathy which were evoked by cases, as the 
following shows:  
The thing that makes me angry in cases like these is the fact that companies like these 
must rely on people not seeking legal advice and instead just accepting that they signed 
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a contract, and therefore have no remedy if they wanted a refund. ..... In a hard 
economic climate, people seem more willing to walk over others to protect themselves, 
DQG,¶PJODGWKDWWKH/DZ&OLQLFJLYHVPHDFKDQFHWRVWLFNXSIRUSHRSOHZKRPD\
otherwise be trampled. 
A second important influence on moral development is the example set by role models. 
Here, lawyers who support clinic activities were frequently mentioned. Thus one student 
FRPPHQWHGWKDWµ>L@WLVYHU\KHDUWHQLQJWRVHHKRZPDQ\SHRSOHDUHSUHSDUHGWRJLYe up their 
WLPHDQGUHVRXUFHVWRFRPHLQDQGGRWUDLQLQJHYHQWVIRUVWXGHQWV¶7KLVVHQWLPHQWZDV
HFKRHGE\DQRWKHU¶VFRPPHQWVRQWKHODZ\HUVZKRYROXQWHHUfor the 86/&¶VHYHQLQJDGYLFH
sessions:   
I have been heartened by the strength of their commitment to the project and to the pro 
bono cause in general.  The practitioners are very busy individuals who are giving of 
WKHLUWLPHDWWKHHQGRIZKDW,¶PVXUHLVDORQJDQGRIWHQVWUHVVIXOGD\DQGWKLVJLYHVPH
a degree of comfort about the profession I am planning to enter. 
Even clearer in evincing a commitment to ATJ after graduation were two students who were 
inspired by a practitioner teaching Ethics and Justice. Thus, her work as a legal aid lawyer 
and founder of an environmental law centre showed Isla thaWVKHµFDQZRUNLQSULYDWHSUDFWLFH
DQGVWLOODFKLHYHKHUXOWLPDWHDLPRIKHOSLQJRWKHUV¶ZKHUHDV6HDPXVGHFODUHGWKDWE\
µSXWWLQJVRPHWKLQJEDFNLQWRWKHFRPPXQLW\¶WKURXJKKHUSURERQRDVVLVWDQFHRIKLVFOLHQW
VKHKDGDFWHGDVµDSRVLWLYHUROHPRGHO¶DQGEHHQµLQVSLUDWLRQDOWRPHIRUP\RZQFDUHHU¶ 
Finally, a third crucial influence on moral development are feelings of satisfaction or 
regret evoked by events. For example, informing a client that her employment case had been 
unsuccessful was for one stuGHQWµRQHRIWKHKDUGHVWWKLQJV,¶YHGRQHLQWKHODZFOLQLFIURP
an emotional standpoint. This was partly due to the fact that mistakes were made on this case 
and I had a strong feeling RIKDYLQJOHWWKHFOLHQWGRZQ¶Conceivably this experience is likely 
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to make her more inclined to go the extra mile for clients in the future. Far more frequently, 
students highlighted their satisfaction at helping clients, with some indicating that this has 
made them think differently about their future careers.  Thus Isla¶VVDWLVIDFWLRQat helping a 
client who had been turned down by eight law firms, prompted her to state:  
,GLGQ¶WVWDUWP\ODZGHJUHHWRµPDNHDGLIIHUHQFH¶0\JRDOZDVVLPSO\WRHDUQHQRXJK
PRQH\VR,FDQDIIRUGVRPHRIOLIH¶VOX[XULHVDQGKDYHQRILQDQFial troubles. However, 
having seen the positive effect my time and effort has had on clients of the clinic has 
changed my perspective and now, my ultimate goal is to find a job that provides both 
financial security and a chance to help communities or less fortunate individuals.¶  
In addition to these specific influences on moral development, students frequently cited 
their clinic experience more generally and the shared ethos of USLC students as influencing 
their attitudes to ATJ, as the following show: 
When I started on the path to a law degree... I thought I believed in access to justice for 
DOOWKDWMXGLFLDOMXVWLFHVKRXOGQ¶WMXVWEHWKHSUHVHUYHRIWKRVHZLWKWKHPRQH\WRSD\IRU
it. Having spent more time, and become involved in the work of the Law Clinic, I now 
know that I believe in access to justice, not just as a theory, but in practice.  
The most remarkable thing that has struck me is that my drive for access to justice has 
actually increased in my time in the clinic whereas I thought there was a risk that this 
spark would disappear once I got into the swing of things. This I believe is down to the 
attitude of the whole Clinic which keeps advisors motivated to strive towards assisting 
many people in the best way possible.  
In some cases, appreciation of ATJ problems led to the assertion of an intention to play 
a role in redressing them once in practice, as these entries illustrate:  
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Since losing his appeal, everywhere he has turned, the door has been closed. CAB 
refused to assist; firms of solicitors were also ignorant of the law, and also declined. 
Such ignorance deprives those most in need of access to justice, and a fair outcome. ... 
Surely it is essential that justice is accessible to all, regardless of who they are? That is 
the overriding reason why I want to work in the legal profession.  
Once I become a practising solicitor, I hope to continue pro bono work as helping 
people without expectation does make you feel good about yourself and increasing 
access to justice will provide more people with the legal expertise required to resolve 
their dispute. 
(YHQPRUHGUDPDWLFDOO\&DOXPVWDWHGµ>E]efore my experience in the Clinic, I had imagined 
DFDUHHULQDODUJHODZILUPDQGKDGQ¶WUHDOO\FRQVLGHUHGWKHODUJHULGHDORIVRFLDOMXVWLFH
Now I find iWLPSRVVLEOHQRWWR¶ 
But these were not empty words. Calum now works for a law centre. More generally, 
many of those students who diaries have been analysed and are now in practice have, like Isla 
acted upon their stated intention to pursue a career which serves social justice or like Seamus 
fulfilled their stated commitment to engage in pro bono assistance, as well as donating to the 
USLC. Indeed, so many USLC alumni have returned to staff evening advice sessions that it 
has doubled the number of clients advised each year.  
 
Access to justice and clinic models   
 
However, while these anecdotal observations about the link between clinical experience and 
post-graduation behaviour are echoed by many others (see references cited in Nicolson, 2008, 
p.165n.124), Sandefur and Selbin (2009) found that, when (recollected) attitudes students had 
when entering US law schools were controlled for, there was no evidence of clinical 
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experience developing, as opposed to sustaining, a pre-existing commitment to engage in pro 
bono or practise law for the benefit of others (see also Rhode (2004, ch. 7 and Granfield, 
2007 on more wide ranging pro bono programmes which also include externships, legal 
research projects, but cf the more positive findings of Schmedemann, 2009 including in 
relation to clinic involvement). Of course, this is no mean achievement itself given the 
JHQHUDOO\QHJDWLYHLPSDFW86OHJDOHGXFDWLRQKDVRQVWXGHQWV¶DOWUXLVWLFPRWLYDWLRQVIRU
practising law (summarised in Granfield and Veliz 2009, pp. 53-4) and the already noted 
dominance of the values of KRPR°FRQRPLFXV in contemporary neo-liberal world. However, 
in addition to possible differences in pre-existing altruistic attitudes between US students and 
those entering the USLC, v  and in the impact of their legal education on such attitudes 
(Nicolson) differences in clinicvi orientation and resultant student experiences might also be 
important.   
The in-house clinic model adopted in most law schools is one which, as Sanderfur and 
6HOELQ¶VUHIHUHQFHWRµFOLQLFDOWUDLQLQJ¶ suggests (2009, passim), prioritises teaching legal 
skills, how law operates and sometime also legal ethics. Usually clinic involvement is limited 
to one or at most two semesters (though in the US students may take more than one clinical 
class), and the focus on student learning dictates low staff-student ratios and low caseloads. 
In too quickly dismissing clinics as a beachhead for resisting the neo-liberal turn Thornton 
(2010, pp. 83-KDVLQPLQGVXFKµHGXFDWLRQDOO\-RULHQWHG¶(2FOLQLFVZKLFKVKHFRUUHFWO\
sees as too expensive to involve many students being exposed to issues of social justice.  
By contrast, as I have argued elsewhere (Nicolson 2006 and 2015), social-justice 
oriented (SJO) clinics, particularly if wholly or largely extra-curricular, have a number of 
advantages in this regard, which suggest that their impact might be greater than that of 
curricular EO clinics. Supervision and training can be limited to ensuring that clients gain 
acceptable levels of service rather than the personal development of students, thus allowing 
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for much higher staff-student ratios and hence more students serving more clients. In 
addition, they can remain in extra-curricular clinics for the duration of their studies. While 
this will expand the breadth of their experiential learning, its quality can be enhanced by 
classes devoted to exploring the ethics and justice of law, legal practice and the legal system 
and providing students with opportunities for the sort of guided reflection which is essential 
to make the most of experiential leaning in general (Brayne et al, 1998) and community 
service in particular (Wizner & Aiken, 2004; Schmedemann, 2009; Adcock, 2013; Morin & 
Waysdorf, 2013). $VDQH[DPSOHRIVXFKDµK\EULG¶FOLQLF1LFROVRQfor a budget of 
around £80,000 a year, the USLC has over 200 student volunteers ± approximately a third of 
all law school students ± who remain members for up to five years in which they represent 
around ten clients, as well as sitting in on evening advice sessions and engaging in other 
forms of community service such as public legal education programmes in schools and 
prisons, supporting gender violence survivors, law reform work and the investigation of 
miscarriages of justice.  
Compared to EO clinics, SJO clinics thus have economies of scale which allow ATJ 
to be better served both directly by redressing more unmet legal need and indirectly by 
ensuring students a more extended exposure to the sort of clinical experience which may 
develop or at least sustain a commitment to enhancing ATJ on graduation. Arguably, they 
have other advantages in regard to this latter goal. One is that prioritising student education 
over community service risks undermining this goal by implicitly conveying to students that 
their interests - now educational but later commercial - trump those of clients and the 
community. Moreover, choosing cases in terms of their educational value rather than client 
needs (as some clinics apparently do: Nicolson 2006) reduces the chances of learning lessons 
about the dire state of ATJ and the satisfaction to be gained in helping those affected. 
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Secondly, three features of extra-curricular clinics enhance their potential to 
successfully transmit their more altruistic message and to act as an alternative model to neo-
liberal legal practice. One is that long-standing involvement in a distinct organisation, with 
perhaps a constitution, elections or an appointment process for committee positions, creates 
condition conducive to a much stronger and cohesive ethos which can be transmitted through 
an AGM and committee meetings, as well as formal and informal social events, and other 
forms of informal socialisation which arise when people are involved in working close with 
and forming friendships with like-minded colleagues (cf Jackson et al, 1995). Secondly 
because students often help run such clinics, they are more likely to feel a sense of 
µSV\FKRORJLFDORZQHUVKLS¶LQµWKHLUFOLQLF¶DQGLWVJRDOV. According to empirical research, this 
tends to lead to them going the extra mile in fulfilling their responsibilities (Pierce et al, 
2¶'ULVFROOHWDO, but it may also reveal to students a more effective and 
civilized alternative to the new managerialism of legal practice. Thirdly, students who give 
up time to help run the clinic as well as helping clients act as altruistic role models.  
However, notwithstanding the USLC¶Vs relatively cost-effective model, resource 
limitations and the commitment to select students who are primarily motivated by social 
justice means that around half of the 120 or so students who apply each year have to be 
turned away.. Consequently, their desire for experiential learning is met by arranging 
opportunities for externships in legal advice agencies and participatioQLQWKH86/&¶VSXEOLF
legal education programmes. And, in order to maximise the potential for these experiences to 
raise awareness of ATJ problems and inculcate a commitment to redress them, these students 
are also offered classes which, in addition to developing relevant legal and transferable skills, 
encourage them to reflect on their experiences in the light of reading and class discussion on 
ATJ and legal ethics.  
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Admittedly, such potential is already rather limited given that many of these students 
have already been judged to lack the necessary altruism for USLC membership and none will 
be subjected to the socialisation effects of a cohesive organisation with a strong social justice 
ethos, whereas those engaging in public legal education will not experience the potentially 
empathy inducting experience of assisting those who would otherwise lack legal assistance. 
However, for law schools which cannot afford an EO or a curricular SJO clinic, or who do 
not have staff willing to support extra-curricular clinics, other forms of active learning will 
certainly go some way to accommodate students who are motivated to study law in order to 
serve justice. It will also enable the exploitation of less altruistic VWXGHQWV¶ thirst for greater 
engagement with legal practice for the purposes of developing in at least some of them a 
greater sensitivity to ATJ problems and a commitment to their redress. 
The SHMRUDWLYHFRQQRWDWLRQVRIµH[SORLWDWLRQ¶might however raise ethical eyebrows. 
Utilitarians will respond that any harm to students is justified by the overriding benefit to the 
community. Certainly, it is arguable that any such exploitation is less than that involved in 
EO clinic students µpractising on WKHSRRU¶(Thornton, 2010, p. 83), rather than for the poor. 
But even in terms of Kantian ethics, students involved in clinical programmes which 
prioritise social justice are not treated merely as a means to such ends. Even if not formally 
trained to ensure a quality service to clients, they cannot but acquire enhanced employability, 
skills and knowledge from case and public legal education work, as well management, team-
ZRUNLQJDQGRWKHUYDOXDEOHµWUDQVIHUDEOHVNLOOV¶LQKHOSLQJWRUXQH[WUD-curricular clinics. 
Moreover, as long as law schools make clear that students must prioritise client and 
community needs over their own educational interests and that clinical classes include a focus 
on ethics and justice, prospective students are always free not to participate or to apply to 
universities with EO clinics.  
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Similar arguments suggest that the increasing desire by universities to enhance 
graduate employability is not being exploited when they fund clinical programmes which 
openly prioritise social justice. More fundamentally, however, it might be argued that 
universities should never prioritise community service over student education (see eg De 
Klerk,  2007, 98). In response, it can be noted that it has recognised since at least the nineteenth 
century when Humbolt developed his vision of universities contributing to the common weal 
through research as well as teaching. Today this extends to µknowledge exchange/ transfer¶ 
whereby universities share learning, ideas and experience with the community (Thornton, 
2010, ch. 5). Admittedly many might see this more in terms of marketing the products of 
research rather than public service, but Thornton herself notes that neo-liberalism has 
encouraged stronger university links with the community (Thornton 2010, p. 206). Indeed, 
the University of Strathclyde showcases the USLC as fulfilling its founding mission as a 
µplace of useful learning¶ notwithstanding its strong entrepreneurial focus (Clarke, 1998).  
But even DVUHJDUGVXQLYHUVLWLHV¶HGXFDWLRQDOPLVVLRQ, SJO clinical programmes 
arguably make no less a contribution than EO programmes. Thus, their goal of instilling in 
students a commitment to ATJ is more closely aligned to that of liberal legal education of 
producing good citizens. Moreover, while EO clinics clearly have the advantage as regards 
developing vocational skills and knowledge, their more indirect acquisition by far more 
students in SJO clinics might well lead to greater overall educational enhancement.   
More fundamentally, it can be asked whether those who pay for legal education are 
likely to object to clinics prioritising community service over education. Fee-paying students 
can always apply to universities with EO clinics, but may in fact prefer to opt for the longer-
lasting and more varied practical experience of extra-curricular SJO clinics, especially if 
access to intensive clinical classes is rationed. And to the extent that legal education is 
publicly funded, it seem unlikely that many taxpayers will baulk at law schools seeking to 
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redress the fact that many of their graduates currently do not repay the privilege of a publicly 
funded legal education by reducing unmet legal need. 
 
Conclusion: towards an activist legal education 
  
While this article was primarily directed at exploring the role of ATJ in legal education, less 
directly it sketches a more general vision of legal education which adds to the growing 
consensus that the distinction between the liberal and vocational approaches to legal 
education is artificial and overly rigid (eg Hepple, 1996, Johnstone 1999; Boon & Webb 
2010). Instead, this vision ± like that of Goldsmith (1999, 2002; Goldsmith & Bamford, 
2010) - sees student involvement in work environments as an effective± if not the most - 
effective means of pursing the goals of a critical legal education through encouraging 
students to reflect on how law actually operates, its justice as well as access to justice and the 
ethical implications for practitioners. Such an education combines the focus on theory, 
context, justice and ethics which characterises a liberal legal education with the engagement 
with legal practice which characterises a vocational legal education in a way that is aimed at 
producing law graduates who see justice as part of their professional calling (Nicolson 2013).  
While as regards the teaching of law, ethics and justice, this approach can be better 
described as critical rather than liberal, the term µactivist¶ better captures its overall aims and 
methods. Thus, it seeks to foster activists for justice, whether social justice more generally 
especially as regards those who do not enter legal practice, or substantive legal justice and 
access to justice more specifically if they do, and pursues these goals through providing 
opportunities for active learning in the context of legal practice.  
The theoretical focus on critique and context should appeal those who share 
7KRUQWRQ¶VYLVLRQRIDVRFLDOO\OLEHUDOOHJDOHGXFDWLRQZKHUHDVWKHSUDFWLFDOIRFXVshould 
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appeal to students and universities who demand greater vocationalism and to high street and 
legal aid practitioners who want graduates with the sort of skills, knowledge and experience 
developed in law clinics and externships and to compete for the best graduates with the more 
powerful large law firms. The latter are likely to be ambivalent about an education which 
seeks to produce graduates who are more practice-ready, but less ready to practice for the 
benefit of those with the deepest pockets rather than in most need or, as Luban (1988, p.83)  
for µWKHSHUVRQ-in-no-trouble, but-who troubles- RWKHUV¶ rather than the µSHUVRQ-in-WURXEOH¶. And 
although Bradney (2003) ZDQWVWRUHVLVWWKHSURIHVVLRQ¶VGHPDQGVIRUJUDGXDWHVUHDG\WR
make money for their employers, the unashamed espousal of a particular view of legal practice 
and particular set of values rather than another (altruism rather than materialism) in an activist 
legal education seems also to conflict with his idea of an education exposing students to 
competing views but not seeking to privilege some over others. But just as market control 
distorts economic markets, I would argue that the dominance of the large law firms in the 
recruitment market justifies seeking to ensure something like a level playing field as regards 
competing professional visions. Furthermore, while engaging more with legal practice might, 
as the opponents of vocationalism argue, be unfair to the many law graduates who do not 
enter legal practice (at least if one thinks that law schools can teach law sufficiently 
accurately, critically or ethically without engaging with practice), not doing so is unfair to 
those who do go into practice, if not also to the many more who hope to do so, and certainly 
to those who suffer from problems of access to justice.  
At the same time, despite believing strongly that law schools should pursue an activist 
agenda, there is no reason why its content should replicate that outlined in this article. There 
are many other issues (human rights, gender, race and class, for example), which could 
become the focus of attention, many other forms of experiential learning (problem-based 
learning or simulated practice scenarios, for example) which can be used, and myriad ways 
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law schools can combine these two activist dimensions depending on particular interests, 
pedagogical beliefs and political commitments. Nevertheless, the vision sketched in this 
article should appeal to those who are convinced that students and academic who directly 
benefit from legal education have a moral obligation to promote justice, while simultaneously 
responding to many of the directly opposed pressures which stem from the forces of neo-
liberalism.  
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